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Discussion after the Speeches of M. Jean Anderson
and Jonathan T. Fried
QUESTION, Mr. Miller: In what new ways can we think about sover-
eignty and jurisdiction so that we permit more flexibility and a greater
participation of a wider range of interests?
ANSWER, Mr. Fried: The government has certain sovereign preroga-
tives that go beyond the particular industry or sector involved, and the
government must preserve and protect these prerogatives.
At one point during the negotiations of the FTA, some industry
groups proposed self resolution of dumping cases. The problem with
such a proposal is that competition laws give rise to the concern that
there will be collusion in the resolution of industry-to-industry disputes.
Two combatant industries may easily raise their prices so that they both
make money and the consumer suffers. The government, however, will
not accept this kind of private sector participation unless every affected
group is allowed to participate in the dispute, at which point, the dispute
resolution becomes unmanageable. Governments are involved to repre-
sent the range of private sector interests.
A second observation is that sovereignty may be somewhat elastic.
Sovereignty under traditional international definitions is plenary and ex-
haustive. Government only surrenders sovereignty voluntarily. Govern-
ments have surrendered some of their authority to the GATT. In other
words, they have agreed to discipline themselves in accordance with the
agreed upon international rules. The two governments have also agreed
to further discipline under the FTA.
I tried to emphasize that under Chapter 18, the necessary flexibility
in terms of rules, already exists for the governments to gain input as
sponsors of creative solutions.
QUESTION, Mr. Coombe: Ms. Anderson, I would like to know the pro-
cess by which a Chapter 19 binational panel is permitted or obligated to
review a complaint of an "interested party," assuming that it is a party
from the private sector in the United States.
ANSWER, Ms. Anderson: In the United States, any party to the under-
lying administrative proceeding has the right to request a panel. If a
private party to a case requests a panel, they must formally notify the
U.S. government. There is an absolute requirement by law in the United
States that the government must forward that request instantaneously
with no discretion to decide whether or not a panel should be created.
QUESTION, Mr. Morrison: The description of an Article 19 proceeding
was extremely interesting because it is so unique. During the period in
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which Congress enacted the article, there was considerable discussion
about the constitutionality of the provision. This debate arose because
the judicial review provisions in the United States were changed. In my
opinion, there are two separate sets of issues, one of which the House
Committee dealt with very well; the other of which they neglected
entirely.
The first issue is whether a party has a right to judicial review of a
decision by an administrative agency under these circumstances? The
answer to that question seems to be no. Second, is there anything inher-
itently wrong with arbitration, particularly on the international level?
The answer also seems to be no.
I have no doubt that the agreement could have either provided for
no judicial review or could have provided for an elimination of the ad-
ministrative agency and provided for an arbitration by the five member
panel. What we have is a hybrid in which a governmental entity, the
U.S. Trade Commission, in the case of Pork International, makes an ad-
ministrative decision as the arm of the United States government. Then
private parties overrule this government entity - a situation which in my
view is unheard of. It is in essence, a surrender of sovereignty by private
parties. This surrender of sovereignty is not at the substantive level but
after an administrative process has gone forward.
Under the United States Constitution, it seems that Congress had
two choices. They could send the matter to judicial review, or they could
have put the matter into arbitration. Congress cannot provide for judi-
cial review by people who are not judges or members of the Executive
Branch. The specific clause in the United States Constitution which was
not mentioned, is the Appointments Clause. This clause requires the
President to appoint people who are officers of the United States.
There is also a provision in U.S. law providing for judicial review. I
wonder whether any parties who are dissatisfied with the panel result,
such as in the Pork controversy or in any of these other controversies, are
considering a constitutional challenge to these provisions.
ANSWER, Ms. Anderson: I have no way of knowing whether they are
considering a constitutional challenge. But I will say a couple of things
in response to your comments. First, the Appointments Clause issue was
not exhaustively considered, but it was considered at great length. There
was a lot of work and effort put into analyzing the applicability of the
Appointments Clause and any difficulties that might arise under it in the
context of first negotiating the agreement and then in the legislative pro-
cess of passing the implementing statute for the FTA. The conclusion
was that it was a fairly neglected part of the Constitution, in terms of
court decisions, for some years. Only recently have a couple of major
cases raised this issue. We did, therefore, look at the clause.
There were some people in the office of legal counsel in the justice
department who took exception to the notion that a binational panel
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could be created. This was so not only because the panel members came
from the private sector, but also because some of them are not even
Americans and are given the authority to make a decision that would
then be absolutely binding on agencies of the U.S. government. The first
job of the office of legal counsel and the justice department is to protect
the flexibility, discretion, and authority of the President. Consequently a
lot of analysis of this issue took place. The conclusion of a lot of consti-
tutional scholars was that the Buckley and Synar cases were cases in
which Congress was trying to usurp power from the presidency by deny-
ing the President his appointments power. Whereas in this case, almost
by definition under the Constitution, trade agreements are done jointly
by the President and the foreign affairs power with the negotiating au-
thority. Congress, which has the constitutional power over trade, had
delegated to the President the authority to negotiate this agreement.
Therefore, there was not a separation of powers issue in creating the
binational panel.
You will also notice that in the FTA implementing statute, it states
that the decisions by the binational panel shall be binding on the admin-
istrative agencies of the United States, the Commerce Department, and
the International Trade Commission. If this provision is declared uncon-
stitutional, the "fallback" option should be used. The "fallback" is that
the President has a scintilla of discretion to accept the decision of the
panel and then can instruct the agencies to impose it. The President is-
sued an executive order saying that he automatically accepted all the
panels decisions and was imposing them on the agencies. This assured
that if the first alternative under the statute, the preferred one, was de-
clared unconstitutional, the "fallback" would automatically come into
play.
All this leads me to think that if anybody files a constitutional chal-
lenge on this issue, they are probably wasting their time and money.
COMMENT, Mr. Fried: I just want to add one word from a foreign
prospective, and that is the lesson of the Uranium Claims Tribunal in the
Supreme Court decision in Dames & Moore v. Reagan. It may look like
judicial review, but starting from your premise, which is that there is no
inherent right to review, all that has been done is that remedies have been
set out in an international agreement, which the President is free to do,
according to Dames & Moore, and certainly, when there is a joint con-
gressional and administration agreement to do so.
As a result, what we have is a decision of an international tribunal,
which is made part of U.S. law by the statute and the implementing
rules. As a result of these rules, the President has undertaken in effect to
say, "Yes, I agree in advance to abide by my international legal
obligations."
QUESTION, Mr. B. Smith: You have shifted judicial review under do-
mestic law from a domestic court to a binational panel. To what extent,
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in your knowledge of the Chapter 19 decisions, would the result have
been different if those decisions had gone to a domestic court?
ANSWER, Ms. Anderson: There is really no way to answer that ques-
tion, but I will say that if those cases had gone to the Court of Interna-
tional Trade, they would have been heard by a single judge. The decision
received in a particular case may depend on the judge who heard the
case. The court is overworked and has less time to devote than does a
panel. Once the decision is rendered, it would probably be appealed to
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit where I think you get fifteen
minutes to argue your case.
The process of five panelists, willing to give it all the time in the
world, seems to assure that it will be a reasoned decision rendered in a
shorter time frame than a court decision.
QUESTION, Mr. Robinson: This question concerns the alternative sys-
tem that we are supposedly working on and the relationship to what is
going on at GATT, assuming the Uruguay Round gets back on its feet. I
think it is generally regarded that Canada shot itself in the foot in finan-
cial services under the FTA by deregulating at the same time it was try-
ing to negotiate concessions in financial services in the United States. I
have heard respectable academics say that under the draft subsidy code,
under which I assume Canada has had significant input, our regional
subsidies and our provincial industrial research and other grants are de-
fined as countervailable subsidies.
What were we doing at the Uruguay Round skewering all of our
regional and other policies that we desperately want to retain in Canada?
ANSWER, Mr. Fried: I think both of these premises are wrong. Re-
garding financial services, while there were some articulate spokesmen
suggesting that we should hold back on rearranging our pillars of the
financial system in order to concede it as a negotiating chip to the United
States. I think the government's decision was that independent of any
free trade negotiation with the United States, it was in our own national
self interest to proceed with that deregulation regardless.
Concerning the subsidies code, it is my understanding that it is quite
the opposite. If anything, Canada is as vigorous as ever in seeking to
insure that appropriate protection and recognition is given to the role of
regional development in government domestic regulation.
There is no single text ready to be signed by the Uruguay Round
negotiators of any country. There is a suggestion that some sort of sys-
tem should be used, like the traffic light system in which certain subsidies
are clearly identified as absolutely prohibited, such as direct export subsi-
dies, and some are labeled as purely domestic, such as unemployment,
health, and other areas like that. The middle ground are those which,
until they have a distorting impact on trade, are placed in a yellow light
category. This says in effect that, if it has an impact on trade, then it is
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not illegal. As to where each kind of regional development program
falls, green or yellow, it is yet to be determined.
Binationally, we are already two years into the five-year time table
of the subsidies working group. Have we been sitting on our hands? No.
Both countries have been procuring and obtaining exhaustive informa-
tion regarding their own programs federally and provincially and regard-
ing programs of each country. Each side will be well armed in any
binational discussion to have an honest discussion as to who is really
doing what. Both sides have decided, while they continue to compile the
information, to hold any negotiations pending the results of the Uruguay
Round. It may well be that improved definitions coming out of the
round as well as tighter dispute settlements and consequent amendments
to the codes, may well influence both governments to say, "Gee, that is
really all we set out to do and that gives us some greater security in any
event. Let's adopt that." Or they might say, "Let's build upon that
model and add a few extra bells and whistles ourselves." Or, the Uru-
guay Round might collapse and then we will have to do it bilaterally as
best we can.
But in the meantime, we are devoting most of our energy to two
things: compiling information bilaterally and working diligently
multilaterally.
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